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INTRODUCTION 
The sheer variation across the Americas in terms of cross-border flows of persons, goods, 
and data has created a highly complex set of challenges for states and non-state actors in this 
hemisphere. Globalization has accelerated and increased these flows across the Western 
Hemisphere’s borders, within both licit and illicit networks. Traditional territorial security 
concerns declined in the Americas following the end of the Cold War, and NAFTA in North 
America and Mercosur in the Southern Cone have promoted free trade and accompanying 
economic development in border regions. At the same time, other concerns pertaining to security 
and the market have arisen, such as the shifting of routes for narcotics and human trafficking 
from the Andes, Central America, and the Caribbean in the 1980s into the United States and 
Mexico in the last decade. This dynamic has fostered substantial illicit networks and a dramatic 
escalation of violence in a number of borderlands in the hemisphere. Furthermore, issues of 
identity and ethnicity that were disregarded during much of the 19th and early 20th centuries now 
present challenges to states as national majorities, indigenous populations, and inhabitants of 
borderlands debate issues of citizenship, migration, and even the legitimacy of existing borders. 
This project has sought to understand how border policies affect, and are affected by, 
national and subnational actor preferences, including the interaction of border policies with 
international, domestic, and subnational politics. We were particularly interested in the 
unintended consequences and conflicts that arise as states attempt to formulate and implement 
policies addressing different imperatives in American borderlands. This project report 
underscores the extent to which we find important differences between the borders and 
borderlands in the Americas and those in other regions of the world. This has important 
implications for how we foster collaborative border policies going forward in the Western 
Hemisphere. 
The report first presents the project methodology and defines how borders and 
borderlands in the Americas were conceptualized by participants in the project. It then presents 
the project’s key findings and identifies avenues for future research. 
PROJECT METHODOLOGY 
This project is explicitly comparative in nature. It not only focuses on borders and 
borderlands across the Americas, it also draws on insights from other regions of the world. 
Although the majority of participants were experts on the Western Hemisphere, the project also 
sought views from scholars of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East to provide context and suggest 
insights that may be useful for explaining the current policies and practices we observe in the 
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Americas. The cases considered also look backwards in history to identify trends and recurring 
phenomena that may offer insight into why some borders and borderlands remain particularly 
problematic for states in the region. 
The project consulted experts in policy and academia to identify critical cases and 
important findings on the nature of borders and borderlands in the Americas. The experts were 
selected because of their deep knowledge of specific cases and, for one more comparative panel, 
their theoretical expertise. Authors were each asked to write a 10-page think piece focused on 
border issues. To provide additional background on the systematic study of borders and 
borderlands, all participants received a concept paper that reviewed contemporary literature on 
this subject and identified variations between observations made in Europe and North America – 
where border studies as a discipline has largely focused – and those made throughout the 
Western Hemisphere. In collaboration with the Center for International Security and Cooperation 
at Stanford University, the project culminated with a workshop on 18 and 19 June 2012 in Palo 
Alto, California for 35 experts from across the Americas and beyond, including U.S. government 
officials from the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Southern Command 
(USSOUTHCOM), and U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). 1  Participating experts 
provided think pieces and briefings highlighting key findings and relevant cases, drawing on 
their knowledge to contribute to the key findings presented in this report.  
THINKING ABOUT BORDERS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE AMERICAS 
What are the purposes of a border? From the perspective of this project, borders are much 
more than geopolitical boundaries delimiting sovereignty. They may contribute to or detract 
from security; they may serve as a focus for national defense (or not); they can define identities 
both for national and local populations; they may be cash cows for local or national government, 
for instance as sites of huge investments in security technologies or the collection of tariff 
revenues; and they can create arbitrage opportunities for private actors by differentiating 
jurisdictions and regulating or facilitating flows of money, people, goods, and data. 
Although there is no unifying lexicon across the social sciences for studying borders, the 
existing scholarship generally focuses on four dimensions:  
1. borders as an external boundary delimiting sovereignty (geopolitics),  
2. borders as a boundary of internal security and the rule of law (policing),  
3. borders as an economic space affecting transactions between and among different 
forms of private and public actors, and  
4. borders as an imagined community (identity).2   
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These conceptualizations/approaches tend to draw on evidence from Europe and, to a lesser 
extent, North America for support, and yet if we look comparatively across the Western 
Hemisphere, we see a wide range of variation and deviation from standard explanations across a 
number of the dimensions.   
Borders in the Western Hemisphere present a particularly intriguing set of puzzles 
because they point out the inherent contradictions between dynamics of economics, security, and 
identity, and between national border policy interests, on the one hand, and the interests of actors 
within borderlands on the other. From a geopolitical perspective, there are multiple international 
territorial and maritime border disputes in the Western Hemisphere, but few states are willing to 
fight militarily over contested boundaries. On the other hand, from a policing perspective, 
borders in the Western Hemisphere have become highly contested. In spite of the lack of 
interstate wars, or perhaps because of it, conflicts in borders zones are escalating as a result of 
piracy, border banditry, and smuggling of peoples, drugs, and guns, creating tensions both 
between countries and among actors in borderlands. From an economic perspective, increasingly 
open borders have traditionally been associated with economic and demographic growth. 
However, opening borders in the Western Hemisphere has tended to undermine border security 
due to a collateral increase in smuggling, human migration, tax evasion, and trafficking. Finally, 
unlike borders in Europe and elsewhere, borders in the Western Hemisphere have not always 
generated strict “us versus them” identities. Instead, in some borderlands inhabitants on either 
side of the international border have shared ethnic – often indigenous – identities that are 
stronger than state-centered identities and/or have shared economic and security interests that 
differ starkly from the interests of the broader national populations. 
SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS 
Given the sheer amount of variation along the four dimensions of borders in the Western 
Hemisphere, it is only natural to expect to observe differences in state preferences over border 
policies. The border policies resulting from these preferences are a reflection of not just 
structural and international factors, but also domestic politics, national and local institutions, and 
state capacity. Moreover, national governments find that there are tensions between different 
border imperatives, such as economic development and police control or international security 
and border identity. The following section presents the key findings from this project explaining 
the evolution and present status of borders and borderlands in the region, organized along the 
dimensions of international relations, domestic politics, and dynamics within and among 
organizations operating at the border. 
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International Factors  
We live in a world of softened sovereignty, where states increasingly conduct security 
work in bilateral and multilateral settings. The fiscal/military/industrial state pioneered in 18th 
and 19th century Europe might have been able to defend and patrol “hard” borders. This is no 
longer possible today as states increasingly share power with subnational, international, and 
transnational actors.3  
Nevertheless, one key insight presented during the workshop was a cautionary note about 
thinking that in earlier times borders in the hemisphere were enforced or enforceable. 
Historically, smuggling was critical to economic development in countries throughout the 
Western Hemisphere. U.S. history is full of examples in which smuggling was essential for 
economic development and survival, such as during the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the 
Civil War, and Prohibition. Other borders where contraband pioneered illicit trading routes and 
“dark” networks include the Colombia-Venezuela, Ecuador-Colombia, Bolivia-Argentina, 
Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay, and Chile-Peru borders. Contraband goods in these examples are 
understood to be licit goods rendered illicit by the form of their transport (smuggling) to avoid 
high tariffs. Examples include liquor, cigarettes, and domestic durable goods. This form of 
contraband has been replaced by the smuggling of goods that are illegal in and of themselves 
(narcotics), rather than because of the status in which they were transported from one jurisdiction 
to another.4 Many of these goods move along traditional contraband routes used for centuries 
across the hemisphere. 
Though perhaps a hard border may be mythical, nonetheless there are large variations in 
both border functions and the ability of states to use borders to enact these functions across the 
Western Hemisphere. This project found that some of the key elements driving this variability in 
borders were the ability of the state to support capabilities commensurate with its self-defined 
problem set; the relative legitimacy of border policy regimes within society at the local and 
national levels; and the state’s relative tolerance for border porosity, understood here as the 
degree to which individuals and organizations are able to evade state policies at the border to 
achieve their preferred outcome.5 
Borders not only define the limits of state sovereignty, but are also used as tools by states 
to manage critical functions, such as the maintenance of security and identity, defense of 
territorial integrity, and regulation of economic activity. This means that borders help states to 
define what is legal and what is illegal within certain territorial limits. In essence, states construct 
their own border “problem sets” by adopting certain definitions of what is permissible and 
impermissible. 6  Although theoretically states can adjust the problem set that they face by 
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changing these definitions, in practice, border policies tend to be quite “sticky” and difficult to 
change.7 
Border policies are rooted in a deep history of partial, problematic state building in the 
region. Historically, Latin American states have engaged in rivalry rather than war. Rivalry 
benefits these states because it enables the development of nationalism and nationality. Rivalry 
promotes state coherence and acts as an attractor for weak central governments, using 
nationalism to retain some loyalty and some authority over populations in their borderlands.8 
Though rivalry impedes interstate cooperation to resolve border issues in some key cases in the 
Americas (Peru, Bolivia, and Chile; Venezuela and Colombia), it does not rise to such a level 
that it generates the cycle of international conflict, defense preparedness, taxation, and popular 
mobilization. This means that Central and South America did not experience the type of state 
building that led to the development of hard fiscal/military/industrial states in Europe in the 18th 
and 19th centuries.9 This historically limited state capacity across much of the region to address 
border security issues unilaterally, but rivalry also limited the possibility for cooperation across 
borders to address security and other dimensions of borderlands. 
This project found no cases in the Americas in which borders were seriously at risk of 
provoking international war, even in the cases that were most ideologically polarized, as was the 
case on the Colombian-Venezuelan and Colombian-Ecuadorean borders. While we still see the 
militarization of borders as vehicles for signaling during international disputes, we found that 
leaders in the contemporary Americas were constrained by domestic stakeholders and economic 
considerations. In fact, much of the violence identified in borderlands has occurred in precisely 
those spaces where international relations are smoothest, especially due to strong economic 
relations: in Central America, regional economic integration and cross-border flows are growing 
even as states struggle to maintain border security.10 The peaceful settlement of international 
disputes and uti posidetis (the legal concept that borders are based on those inherited from the 
colonial period) has become the norm across the region. In some cases, there is an increased 
tendency to legalize territorial claims, settling border disputes in international tribunals and 
through judicial arbitration. This means that states do not necessarily view their borders as 
matters of existential import, but at most as subjects that may be negotiated.11 
Trade liberalization may be undermining the rationale for conflict in once high-risk areas 
such as Central America, the Southern Cone, and the Colombia-Venezuela border. In particular, 
some experts suggested the desire to attract investment and promote development might be 
having an additional dampening effect on conflict. Colombia-Venezuela may be most extreme 
example of ideological and geopolitical rivalry combined with massive trade growth. In all of the 
cases considered, international trade created domestic stakeholders that influenced national 
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governments to choose to deepen economic ties and liberalize regimes, privileging development 
over security.12 Similarly, trade, fostered through NAFTA, has shaped and affected the U.S.-
Mexico bilateral agenda, leading to increased national, regional, and even local cooperation 
between both countries. But even here we have witnessed unintended consequences as a result of 
9/11 and drug trafficking dynamics. Ironically, the cities and ports of entry that tend to 
concentrate bilateral trade have also witnessed increased drug violence, including Tijuana, 
Juarez, and Monterey. Although drug violence has not yet spilled over into cities such as El Paso 
or San Diego, securitization, militarization, and bilateral conflict have permeated the U.S.-
Mexico border.13 Hence, increased trade may contribute to improved economic transactions and 
raise the costs of war, but it should not be considered a panacea in reducing tension and illegal 
transactions in borderlands. Interestingly enough, licit and illicit actors alike use trade regimes 
(routes, highways, means of transportation, and currencies) to exchange goods and services 
across borders; thus, as long as there is a market, trade will create incentives for legal and illegal 
transactions in common frontiers.   
In addition to establishing trade regimes, states further shape cross-border flows by how 
they define what is licit and illicit. By targeting certain illicit activities, states should be aware 
that they are simultaneously creating attractors and deterrents to participate in that activity 
because the risk premium creates high rewards for successful entrepreneurs. This also attracts a 
particularly risk-acceptant kind of actor into that particular market segment. The competition 
between state border enforcement agencies and illicit traffickers creates a complex adaptive 
dynamic that selects for fitness, analogous to an evolutionary dynamic.14 Taken to the extreme 
(as may be occurring on the U.S.-Mexico border), this effectively creates an X Prize for illicit 
trafficking, analogous to the recent X Prize awarded for the first private space launch. Anyone 
who can get a ton of narcotics across the border is rewarded with millions of dollars in profits, 
while the leadership of the drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) can take a hands-off approach 
that focuses on financing lower level actors that are willing to accept the risk.15 Evidence of this 
dynamic is found in multiple cases across the region, including the tri-border region (Argentina-
Brazil-Paraguay), Central America, and North America (U.S., Mexico, and Canada). 
One final observation regarding international dimensions of borders that emerged from 
the project is the existence and relevance of varied definitions of the border “problem” across the 
region, including divergence between states sharing a common border. For example, the United 
States defines its borders in the wake of 9/11 as being predominantly about security and law 
enforcement, whereas for its neighbors, Canada and Mexico, borders are predominantly about 
economic development and trade.16 Venezuela’s leaders present their border with Colombia as 
primarily a security or even ideological problem, when in fact trade drives the actual border 
policies of both the Colombian and Venezuelan governments.17 In some cases, the states directly 
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involved agree about the border reality, whereas other states do not. For example, Brazil, 
Argentina, and Paraguay agree that the triple frontier region should be understood primarily in 
terms of economic transactions and tourism, but other international actors observe a significant 
security problem.18 These divergences have implications for how states talk to – or past – each 
other about managing common borders. 
When it comes to solutions to border challenges, this project has found that there are two 
alternative models of border security currently in competition: fortress vs. ring of friends. A 
global comparative discussion identified that the European Union has been evolving towards a 
system of rings of friendly or collaborative states, although there are clearly remaining elements 
of fortress mentality (the United Kingdom, the Spanish border with Morocco in Ceuta, and the 
Greek border with Turkey). The contemporary European model of border security has a broader 
human security focus which aims to improve outcomes across diplomatic, development, and 
security dimensions. Europe also focus on subsidizing other border states to improve their own 
capabilities to keep borders from generating a fortress mentality in the European Union.19 In the 
wake of 9/11, the United States initially tended to adopt a fortress mentality for the U.S. and 
Canada, and more ambivalently for Mexico. Since the establishment of DHS and 
USNORTHCOM, there has been a progressive, albeit inconsistent, effort to incorporate Mexico 
in the North American perimeter.20 However, the U.S. approach is not multidimensional since 
the economic and development aspects are frequently managed separately from security and 
migration policies. Nevertheless, we do observe efforts within DHS to collaborate with Central 
American counterparts to build an interagency whole-of-government approach on both sides of 
borders. In practice, this starts to resemble an approach based on “pushing the border out.” 
However, for most of the rest of the hemisphere, U.S. policy is still guided by bilateral 
agreements focused on technical law enforcement and intelligence sharing with neighbors. 
Domestic Factors 
Popular perceptions of borders and borderlands tend to be dominated by single issues that 
obscure the complexity of the border. This single-issue focus on economics, security, or 
migration drives policymaking, even when the focus may be unhelpful. For example, the U.S.-
Mexico border is defined within the U.S. as a problem of illegal migration, often overlooking the 
fact that allowing flows across the border is necessary to enable the economic dynamism of legal 
commerce between the countries. The key problem at the Ecuador-Colombia border is insurgents 
crossing to rest, regroup, resupply, and train in northern Ecuador, yet the logical solution that 
emerged out of a narrow focus on these security challenges has not worked: the Ecuadorean 
Army does all it can to avoid contact with the insurgents.21 Similarly, in the tri-border region of 
South America, international actors insist on focusing on terrorism, even as the main challenge 
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for authorities at the border is smuggling, piracy, and counterfeiting. Single-focus policy 
solutions, particularly those that involve prioritizing security over other dimensions of borders, 
may not prove workable and may provoke negative externalities. 
In the economic realm, a security focus can lead to neglect of potential economic-based 
measures to facilitate legal markets and interfere with illegal ones. Differences in jurisdictions, 
laws, and enforcement levels across borders create incentives for jurisdiction shopping by both 
licit and illicit actors. Licit actors seek the most attractive operating environments, i.e., where the 
profits gained outweigh the cost of operating. In international banking and trade, this creates 
disincentives to increase restrictive regulations or oversight because doing so would drive 
economic activity across border. There are a number of border dyads in the region where 
investing across the border is particularly easy (Argentina-Uruguay or Panama-Colombia). This 
helps to explain the persistent resistance to greater transparency and oversight of financial 
institutions in small states such as Uruguay and Panama that benefit from their status as regional 
banking centers.22 The implications for border collaboration in the Americas is that certain states 
will resist increased border security because of the impact on economic growth. 
When it comes to illicit markets, the dynamic is different, but an economic focus remains 
critical. Illicit actors also engage in jurisdiction shopping to minimize risk and maximize profits. 
This explains the repeatedly observed displacement effect that occurs when law enforcement 
action in certain jurisdictions reduces criminality locally but not regionally. Illicit markets also 
have difficulty solving problems associated with creating credible commitments, protecting 
property rights, reducing transaction costs, and securing flows of (illicit) goods and people. One 
way trafficking organizations solve this problem is through cartelization of illicit markets and 
hybridization of governance (defined as members of criminal organizations participating in 
government and members of government collaborating with criminal organizations). The 
alternative is fragmentation and competition, which tends to lead to high levels of violence in 
illicit markets.23  
Treating borders and borderlands primarily as security concerns also creates problems for 
governments with important domestic stakeholders. Examples include smugglers (Paraguay), 
contrabandists (Bolivia), tax evaders (Argentina), ethnic minorities (Brazil), indigenous 
populations (Andean Region), and the military (Venezuela and Ecuador). Increases in state 
capacity can lead to counter-reaction by local communities that make themselves more opaque to 
the state (Bolivia contraband case). While international partners may view the concerns of a 
number of these stakeholders as illegitimate, they are still influential in national politics, creating 
a disincentive for politicians to increase security at borders.24 Likewise, increasing federal or 
national capabilities (militaries and national policies) to improve border security may create or 
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undermine capabilities and authorities at the local level, fostering bureaucratic competition and 
even conflict at different national levels. 
The legitimacy of border policy in borderlands has a significant impact on the 
effectiveness of state border policies. In a sense, borders are not just fixed lines, installations, 
systems, or institutions; they also exist in the mind of the people that make up a society. There is 
an interaction effect between society, the state, and the border in determining the legitimacy of 
border policy. Public opinion influences how policymakers approach borders and what solution 
sets are acceptable. Local support in borderlands may be particularly critical for a national 
government’s border policy to take root. Local knowledge of how to navigate borders (and how 
illegal border-crossers navigate borders) is frequently superior to that of national authorities. 
Locals are better at identifying those who do not “belong” in border communities. Support from 
local border populations can thus make border policy much more effective. 25 Alternatively, 
where border policies are considered illegitimate, it makes the border regime much less effective 
because local populations have superior knowledge of the means to evade border authorities and 
control. In such cases, border populations actively undermine national-level border policies. 
Unfortunately, governments have historically been bad at consulting and incorporating the 
preferences of local populations or local border control authorities.26 Effective border policies 
require local legitimacy, but local preferences over border policies can be quite different and 
even at odds with national preferences. 
The crucial nature of legitimacy means that once a single-focus border policy leads to 
poorly conceived policies, those policies in turn can trigger negative feedback loops. Such 
negative feedback has the potential of delegitimizing and destabilizing domestic political 
coalitions and triggering political instability. The legitimacy of border policy is a key variable in 
explaining the relative degree of difficulty states face in managing their borderlands. The 
legitimacy of a border policy derives in part from the functional results the policy produces. 
Democratic process and popular opinion become frustrated when single dimension solutions do 
not produce success. Rather than looking for and supporting alternatives, political elites and 
public opinion can become fixated on making the preferred solution work at all costs. This can 
lead to a hardening of positions over time, and generate a negative policy feedback loop. When 
the solution for border dysfunction is defined as more security, border systems can become 
progressively harsh, but not more effective, as has been the case in the United States.27 
Latin American governments have recognized the danger of securitizing borders. Some 
states in the region have resisted securitizing borders is the fear of empowering the militaries in 
fragile democracies. In fact, some Latin American governments, in an attempt to demilitarize 
disputed territorial and maritime borders have instrumentally opted for judicial settlements. This 
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is a legacy reaction to the authoritarian periods that preceded contemporary democracies. When 
combined with economic integration and liberalization, this has produced a de-emphasizing of 
the security dimension along some borders, but has also generated unintended effects, including 
poorly funded militaries.28  
Organizational Factors 
This project also found a tension at the organizational level between agencies operating at 
the border and those making policy at the national level. Local bi-national law enforcement is 
often better informed about the challenges at the border than national authorities, but 
international law and agreements privilege the work of national authorities such as foreign 
ministries, ministries of interior, and ministries of defense. Interference from the central 
government may make border law enforcement worse in some cases by disrupting informal local 
bi-national arrangements designed to control illegality.29 This produced a discussion about how 
cooperation at the local level across borders could be encouraged. Examples included local 
border information sharing, as is being promoted by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) with and among Central American states as DHS seeks to “push U.S. borders out.” Cross-
border information sharing is further facilitated when government officials on each side of the 
border share information within their own governments, a practice that DHS has deliberately set 
out to encourage in partner states and agencies.  
A parallel problem exists in the relationship between international organizations setting 
standards that affect the operation of national border control agencies. International agencies 
may set standards for transport, communication, commercial and human security that are most 
easily enforced at border crossings. However, these international agencies do not take into 
account local conditions, preferring to apply uniform standards using a checklist approach and 
periodic inspections. Not only are the inspections easily spoofed by local authorities, but the 
checklists can lead to an inappropriate emphasis on some dimensions of security while creating 
vulnerabilities in others. The current international regime for air transportation security was 
offered as one example of such a problem. Airports are effectively a borderless zone once people 
penetrate inside a secure area. The airport security regime is focused on securing visitors and on 
facilitating throughput, not on monitoring the permanent employees carrying out airport 
functions. This regime makes it particularly attractive to organized crime since it means that they 
benefit from developing inside agents amongst the permanent employees of secure areas. The 
employees may still do their primary job – securing air transport – while at the same time 
facilitating illicit trafficking.30 
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Perhaps most critically, taking the local border reality seriously alerts us to situations in 
which border control agencies do not have the capacity to perform the functions assigned by 
national policymakers. This tension between local and national authorities may be highest at so-
called “hot” borders were the risk of violence is high. Cases considered by the project included 
the Venezuela-Colombia border, the Ecuador-Colombia border, and the U.S.-Mexico border. 
“Hot” borders create particular problems of overload for domestic security organizations that can 
lead them to shirk or undermine national border security responsibilities.31 For example, in the 
case of Ecuador, the army deliberately avoids confrontations with Colombian insurgents crossing 
the international border, even though it is the policy of the Ecuadorean government to prevent 
such crossings. High levels of violence in Mexico’s northern borderlands overwhelm the 
capabilities of border security agencies and create a zone of impunity along the northern border 
where DTOs engage in competitive and increasingly macabre displays of violence to intimidate 
adversaries and law enforcement.  
In states where border agency capabilities are overloaded by violence or multiple 
responsibilities, security organizations will pick and choose which missions to perform in a way 
that protects the core of the institution.32 This produces a divergence between what national 
policymakers think that they have ordered border security institutions to do, and the work border 
security actors actually perform. This also has implications for international partners who may 
think they have negotiated a common collaborative approach to borders, only to find that local 
security actors are not following the agreed-upon policy regime. Paradoxically, we also found 
that security organizations that are overloaded are reluctant to shed missions because mission 
diversity is seen as a sign of the “value” of the organization to the state and society.  
Though there was strong agreement that the local border reality must be considered when 
analyzing hot and cold borders, some participants cautioned against too much latitude for local 
security forces, noting the problem of maintaining accountability and protecting human rights in 
the absence of national standards or national oversight. This concern is highly relevant to Central 
and South American countries where borders are “hot” due to criminal violence. There, the 
military is frequently the most trusted public institution, which means that the society (and 
consequently politicians) are reluctant to turn to alternative civilian law enforcement solutions. 
On the other hand, military actors are rarely trained to conduct law enforcement operations in 
accordance with national and international legal and human rights regimes. They are also not 
trained to conduct law enforcement operations in accordance with standards for the collection of 
evidence and handling of witnesses so as to maximize the likelihood of successful prosecution 
and conviction of criminal perpetrators. This puts both the military institution and the 
government at risk that increased efforts to enforce the rule of law will produce incidents of 
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human rights violations or fail to produce justice in such a way that these efforts would 
undermine citizen confidence in national authorities. 
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
States determine what a “problem” at the border is through their constitutions, legal 
regimes, and policies. This means that states should be mindful that how they define what is 
legal and illegal can widen or narrow the scope of the problem they face. One way of interpreting 
recent statements in 2012 by the presidents of Colombia and Guatemala favoring a degree of 
decriminalization of some narcotics is precisely an effort to reduce the challenges they face by 
narrowing the scope of the problem. As the disconnect between requirements, threats, and 
available capabilities grows, we should expect to see more states in the hemisphere attempting to 
define away their border challenges as a means to reduce the demand for new capabilities or 
additional investments in security. 
States can also narrow the scope of their border challenges by changing the sites where 
regulatory and enforcement agencies perform their work. For example, in cases of economic 
migration, it may make more sense to target illegal immigration at workplaces rather than at the 
border. If jobs for undocumented migrants are no longer available, the incentive for cross-border 
migration diminishes. Similarly, states increasingly perform border inspections at remote ports 
and transit centers located in foreign jurisdictions to reduce the workload at traditional bi-
national border crossings and ports. The Proliferation Security Initiative, which focused on 
interdicting weapons of mass destruction by enlisting the assistance of foreign partners in 
monitoring and intercepting WMD components and precursors, is another effort that falls into 
this category. In a world characterized by softened sovereignty, efforts to “push borders out” will 
become increasingly common in the future. Importantly, as raised by U.S. government officials 
during the conference, sometimes such policies are not well received by governments that have 
border policy goals that conflict with those of the U.S. government.  
 “Pushing borders out” successfully will require investing in partnerships and 
collaborations with other states in the region. Relatively modest amounts of investment in 
training, capability development, information sharing, and multilateral institution building can 
repay handsome dividends, as the European Union experience with FRONTEX or the 
Department of Homeland Security efforts in Central America suggest. Most U.S. border security 
and law enforcement relationships in the hemisphere are managed on a bilateral basis, and there 
possibility of multilateral institutions should be explored, particularly where they build on pre-
existing regional institutions, such as those existing in Central America or North America. These 
pre-existing regional institutions have already done some of the work of overcoming legacies of 
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interstate rivalries in the region and allowed states to develop their reputation for trustworthy 
behavior in other areas, such as economic development, that could be leveraged to make progress 
in other dimensions, such as security. 
While partnerships and collaborations can strengthen state capacity, a new approach to 
border control and security would also aim to reduce the burden on security agencies by shifting 
the focus from efforts aimed at patrolling thousands of miles of border surrounding a country to 
identifying the areas, transit routes, and persons posing the greatest risk and devoting resources 
there. In particular, border security agencies throughout the hemisphere need to devote more 
resources to focused inspections and enforcement actions based on the behavior of targeted 
individuals and flows of goods, money, and data. The analogy to the searching for a needle in the 
haystack is instructive – to make the needle easier to find, remove as much of the hay as 
possible. One possible avenue that requires further research is developing profiles based on 
behavioral patterns associated with illicit activities rather than on the inherent characteristics of 
individuals. This type of work is already performed by a number of security organizations, and 
although they may find it difficult to share information widely due to concerns over secrecy, it 
may be possible to share the underlying targeting algorithms for suspicious behavior to enable 
partner states and agencies to better target their own capabilities.  
Another way in which states can manage the scope of their border challenges is by 
building the legitimacy of border regimes. Most border enforcement and regulation is essentially 
self-enforcement by citizens. For example, it is estimated that the vast majority of all border 
crossings of goods and persons on the U.S.-Mexico border are legal. The sheer volume of traffic 
overwhelms inspection regimes, yet the reality is that by far the majority of border users 
voluntarily comply with regulations. Building the legitimacy of border regimes is a complex 
interaction between politics, policy, law, and public opinion. One important gap that states need 
to be mindful of is the one that separates the legitimacy of border regimes among borderland 
populations and the nation as a whole. As observed in this project, negative policy feedback 
loops can develop in national politics and produce increasingly harsh measures that in turn are 
rejected and undermined by border populations. How states develop and maintain legitimacy and 
congruence between national and borderland attitudes towards border regimes is an area for 
further study. 
On the other hand, one of the obstacles to interstate collaboration on borders is the 
difference in legal systems, particularly when it comes to the rights of individual citizens. For 
example, U.S. officials have found it more difficult to collaborate with Canadian than Mexican 
counterparts because of the strict privacy laws prevailing in Canada. The effort to build 
legitimacy does not necessarily lead to more compatible views of the legal dimensions of 
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interstate collaboration, and these will be a permanent source of friction. This is another area that 
needs additional research. 
In the very long term, there may be a trend towards a “deep” border, where the border 
exists everywhere inside the state in what is almost a biometric approach to defining who and 
what is legally within the state and what is not. Although there are numerous and very serious 
ethical, political, civil rights, privacy, and legal implications, the technology is rapidly becoming 
available to digitally tag, biometrically identify, or otherwise track and store information on most 
all physical and virtual objects and persons. This type of information could easily be associated 
with other information on legal status, making it possible to electronically query and determine 
who and what belongs in each jurisdiction. This is an area that deserves much more thorough 
study, both because the technology to implement this is almost upon us and because it would 
have very serious implication for the relationship between states, citizens, and institutions. 
In the near term, a collaborative approach to border management among states and other 
actors is increasingly necessary to achieve desirable outcomes such as security and development. 
Collaborative border management involves each state sharing some sovereignty to achieve 
absolute gains. We already see such gains in joint U.S.-Canada border inspection teams, 
Department of Homeland Security collaboration with Central American partners, and U.S.-
Mexico collaboration on law enforcement. Such efforts are much less common in South 
America, where interstate rivalries are still latent and collaborative border management is more 
rare. But more could still be done to strengthen collaborative border management. This includes 
combined bi-national border facilities where regulatory and law enforcement teams from two 
states work side by side to focus on identifying and separating threats. It should also include 
more sharing of intelligence, or at least algorithms and best practices for identifying suspect 
behavior at border crossings. The development of bi-national border teams may be a way of 
capturing the benefits of local knowledge and experience while maintaining accountability and 
oversight. Such a collaborative approach would require a deep commitment by all governments 
involved to understanding and respecting the governments’ different border policy agendas and 
compromising such that the ultimate policy equally serves – and does not serve – the interests of 
each individual state. Additional work is needed to identify emerging best practices here. 
Another area where collaborative border management may pay dividends is in working 
with the private sector. While there is a transaction cost for the private sector when engaging 
with a border, there are also benefits from well-managed and secure borders, not least of which is 
minimizing political risks associated with security failures. The costs to the private sector of the 
security measures adopted in the wake of 9/11 attacks is one example of how heavy a price 
society and private actors can pay when public goods (in this case the provision of security) fail. 
  15 
However, even everyday examples such as airport security are places where the private sector 
benefits enormously from the public provision of security for the air transportation system. One 
way of stretching the capabilities of states is by relieving border agencies of the burdens of 
routine border operations, such as inspections, by outsourcing them and thereby allowing states 
to focus their capabilities more closely on intelligence, enforcement, and regulation efforts that 
target the small percentage of bad actors. Another way of improving the capabilities of states is 
by having the private sector actors that derive the greatest effort from efficient border regimes to 
contribute additional funds to defray the cost of operating these institutions.  
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